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Preventing Child Soldiers
P.W. Singert
It's a good start to write documents and stuff, but it's time to stop theorizing and
start doing work to end this.
Ishmael Beah, age 131
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Introduction
On January 4, 2002, Sergeant 1st Class Nathan R. Chapman became
the first American serviceman to be killed by hostile fire in the War on
Terrorism.2 A Green Beret, Chapman's mission was to coordinate with
local tribal elements in the Paktia province in Afghanistan. 3 Chapman's
unit was ambushed, and he was hit by sniper fire. 4 While many Americans
expected the War on Terror to claim casualties, one aspect of the battle
surprised many: Sgt. Chapman's killer was an Afghani child.
5
The threat of child soldiers continued in Afghanistan after Sergeant
Chapman's death. On July 28, 2002, a grenade fatally injured Sergeant 1st
Class Christopher Speer, a special forces medic, while on operations near
t Dr. Peter Warren Singer is the National Security Fellow at the Brookings
Institution and Director of the Brookings Project on U.S. Policy Towards the Islamic
World. His upcoming book, Children at War (Pantheon, 2005) is the first book to
examine the rise, dynamics, and implications of the child soldiers doctrine. Dr. Singer
has served as an advisor to the U.S. military on the child soldier issue and has lectured
on the topic to venues ranging from Harvard University to the Headquarters of the U.S.
Marine Corps Atlantic Forces. His work on child soldiers has also been featured in
Military Review, People magazine, and the NBC "Today Show."
1. Former Child Soldier. Remarks made to the United Nations Special Session on
Children, May 8, 2002. Editorial: Turning Promises Into Practise, CHILD SOLDIERS NEWS-
LETTER (June 2002) at 22.
2. Timothy W. Maier, Children Are Being Used as Soldiers, INSIGHT, Dec. 2, 2002,
available at http://www.insightmag.com/news/2002/12/10/World/Children.Are.Being.
Used.As.Soldiers-33 1660.shtml.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See id.
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the town of Khost in eastern Afghanistan. 6 His killer was a fifteen-year-old
Al Qaeda member, originally from Canada. 7
Little more than a year later, U.S. forces came in contact with child
soldiers once again. In April 2003, during the war with Saddam Hussein's
government in Iraq, American soldiers were forced to fire on and kill Iraqi
child soldiers in at least two separate instances. 8 Some of these child
soldiers were as young as ten years old.9 Incidents with child soldiers con-
tinued during the guerilla campaign that followed the invasion. 10 U.S.
Army briefings warned of the threat from child soldiers,1 1 ranging from
child snipers 12 to a fifteen-year-old who tossed a grenade in an American
truck, blowing off the arm of an Army trooper. 13
These incidents, though tragic, should not be surprising. The sad real-
ity is that underage soldiers are now an almost inherent feature of the mod-
ern battlefield. Children as young as six years old now comprise as much
as 10% of the world's combatants. 14 Underage soldiers serve in 75% of
the world's conflicts.' 5 They fight in places like Afghanistan, Colombia,
Congo, Iraq, Liberia, Myanmar, Sierra Leone, and Sudan and, with the new
"war on terrorism," increasingly face off against the United States and
other Western armies. 16 Indeed, at least five underage boys suspected of
being Al Qaeda terrorists or Taliban fighters have been imprisoned at the
U.S. military prison on Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. 17
6. Colin Nickerson, Fighting Terror; A Boy's Journey From Canada to Al Qaeda, Bos-
TON GLOBE, Mar. 9, 2003, at A1; Joseph Farah, Family of Canadian Teen Has Extensive Al
Qaida Ties, WORLD NET DAILY, Sept. 6, 2002, available at http://www.worldnetdaily.
com/news/article.asp?ARTICLEID=28850.
7. See Nickerson, supra note 6; Farah, supra note 6.
8. Matthew Cox, War Even Uglier When a Child Is the Enemy, USA TODAY, Apr. 8,
2003, at IA; Alex Perry, When Kids Are in the Cross Hairs, TIME, Apr. 21, 2003, at 57.
9. See Cox, supra note 8; Perry, supra note 8.
10. Mary Beth Sheridan, For Help in Rebuilding Mosul, U.S. Turns to Its Former Foes,
WASH. POST, Apr. 25, 2003, at A10.
11. Enemy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) and Recommendations, 3rd
Corps Support Command Briefing Document, at 27, LSA Anaconda, Iraq [hereinafter
Briefing Document].
12. Report: Marines Wounded in Fighting Late Wednesday in Iraq, Associated Press,
Mar. 26, 2003 [hereinafter Report].
13. See Cox, supra note 8; Martin Bentham, Fedayeen Use Children To Shield Them
from Tank, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, Apr. 2, 2003, at P2.; Briefing Document, supra note 11;
Joseph L. Galloway, Hurt Still Arriving at Army Hospital, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Aug. 22,
2003, at 5A; Perry, supra note 8; Report, supra note 12; Sheridan, supra note 10; Barbara
Slavin, U.S. Troops Clash with Exile Leader's Militia, USA TODAY, May 2, 2003, at 4A.
14. P.W. Singer, Caution: Children at War, PARAMETERS, Winter 2001-2002, available
at http://www.brookings.edu/views/articles/fellows/20011203singer.pdf.
15. P.W. SINGER, CHILDREN AT WAR ch. 2 (forthcoming January 2005), Data on
Radda Barnen, CHILDWAR DATABASE; SIPRI YEARBOOK 2002: ARMAMENIrS, DISARMAMENT
AND INTERNATIONAL SECuRITY app. IA (Taylor Seybolt ed., 2002); see also P.W. Singer,
Children at War, VETERANS VISION, Fall 2002.
16. See M. Eriksson et al., Patterns of Major Armed Conflicts, 1990-2001, in SIPRI
Yearbook 2002, supra note 15, at 63-76, app. IA.
17. National Roundup, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 23, 2003, at 14; Bruce Auster & Kevin
Whitelaw, Terror's Cellblock, U.S. NEws AND WORLD REPORT, May 12, 2003, at 21;
Michelle Faul, U.S. Defends Detaining Teens, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Apr. 27, 2003, at 7A;
Press Release, Human Rights Watch, U.S.: Guantanamo Kids at Risk (Apr. 24, 2003),
Vol. 37
2004 Talk is Cheap
The use of children as soldiers heightens both the frequency and sav-
agery of conflict. It makes conflicts easier to start, tougher to end, and
more likely to recur.18 Even worse, the trend appears set only to magnify
in the coming years. What then should be the proper response?
This Article looks at potential ways to prevent and deter the practice of
child soldiers. To be effective, any effort against the use of child soldiers
must seek to realistically understand the doctrine that drives it. Child sol-
diering stems from a set of deliberate choices and strategies designed to
benefit from using children in war. By understanding the causes, as well as
the resulting dynamics, one can develop more nuanced strategies that
attack the very heart of the practice.
I. Good Deeds Regardless
At the global level, the underlying causes of the rise of child soldiers
include such overarching problems as world poverty, the lack of economic
and educational opportunity for many of the world's youth, and the spread
of war and disease. 19 Regardless of the presence of child soldiers, powerful
reasons exist for tackling these problems. However, the effect of pushing
children into the realm of war makes serious action all the more important.
Indeed, advocates working in these areas should also contemplate linking
their calls for action, now based exclusively on moral concerns, to the
broader security concerns engendered by child soldiers. This will not only
strengthen the advocates' cause, but also make arguments for findings on
new security issues in other fields.
To confront all the varied issues of global distress requires both
increased amounts of aid aimed at sustainable development, as well as
more effective and efficient responses by the recipients. The United States
lags far behind the rest of the developed world in its aid to poorer states. It
spends a far lower percentage of its budget on foreign aid, relative to other
prosperous states. 20 Indeed, of any industrialized country, the United
States gives the lowest percentage of its national Gross Domestic Product
(GDP). 2 1 Among the donors, the United States also has the worst record
for spending its aid budget on itself-70% of American aid is spent on U.S.
available at http://www.hrw.org/press/2003/04/usO42403.htm. According to Auster
and Whitelaw, the ages of the young detainees were thirteen, fourteen, fifteen, and six-
teen, and three were released to Afghan authorities in January 2004. Pamela Constable,
An Afghan Boy's Life in U.S. Custody, WASH. PosT, Feb. 12, 2004, at 1. The United States
has held an additional number of sixteen- to eighteen-year-old detainees in the general
adult population. Interview with Pentagon official, June 2003.
18. Singer, supra note 14.
19. Id. at 4.
20. See Julian Borger & Charlotte Denny, War of Pledges Gives Hope to World's Poor,
THE GUARDIAN, Mar. 21, 2002, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/debt/Story/0,
2763,671171,00.html. For additional information on this topic, see The Reality of Aid
Project: An Independent Review of Poverty Reduction and Development Assistance, at
http://www.devinit.org/realityofaid (2002).
21. Tony German & Judith Randel, Never Richer, Never Meaner, in THE REALITY OF
AID 2002: AN INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF POVERTY REDUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE
148 (2002), available at http://www.devinit.org/ktrends.pdf.
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goods and services. 22 Finally, much of the aid that is pledged is directed at
a limited number of strategic middle-income allies, such as Israel and
Egypt, rather than the poorest nations of the world. 23 When U.S. aid does
go to conflict zones, it often follows the headlines, rather than the need.
For example, during the 1990s, sufferers from the war in Bosnia received
an average of $238 in aid per person from the United States. 24 At the same
time, The Democratic Republic of Congo (D.R.C.) was suffering from a far
more traumatic (over 3 million more deaths occurred in the D.R.C. than in
Bosnia), albeit less publicized civil war, but received only $3 in aid per
person.25 The same dynamic continues today with Iraq garnering most of
the international aid, while other conflict zones continue to fester.
The result is that the U.S. government underfunds a number of critical
global problem areas. For example, AIDS is a grave disease that threatens
to kill tens of millions of people over the next decade, undermine entire
societies, and create an entire generation of orphans vulnerable to child
soldier recruitment. 26 AIDS also cannot be defeated without the proper
amount of resources. Officials estimate that between $7 billion and $10
billion per year is needed to fight its global spread, primarily to fund pre-
vention programs around the world. 27 Yet the international community
falls far short of that goal. Despite its rhetoric, the U.S. government's
response has been insufficient. Thus far, it has pledged approximately
$500 million a year in actual funds. 28 Similar low levels of funding encom-
pass such issues as support for education, refugees, and other aid to needy
communities.
On the opposite side of the equation, it is equally appalling that the
vast majority of developing states still spend far higher percentages of their
national income on their (usually ineffective) militaries than on their own
people's critical health and education needs. Many of these funds could be
shifted toward the next generation of children and actually make a far
greater impact on these countries-alleviating social and economic
problems. 29 Donors should make this reallocation a condition of their aid
grants.
22. Borger & Denny, supra note 20.
23. Id.
24. United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), Children Affected by Armed Conflict:
UNICEF Actions, at 3 (May 2002), available at http://www.unicef.org/emerg/files/
AffectedbyArmedConflict.pdf.
25. Id.
26. Singer, supra note 14 at 5. P.W. Singer, AIDS and International Security, 44 SUR-
VIVAL 145, 150-52 (2002).
27. See Kofi Annan, Statement at African Summit on HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and
Other Related Infectious Diseases, Abuja, Nigeria (Apr. 2001), at http://www.un.org/
News/Press/docs/2001/SGSM7779Rl.doc.html.
28. See Lael Brainard, The Administration's Budget for Global Poverty and HIV/ AIDS:
How Do the Numbers Stack Up? (2003), available at http://www.brookings.edu/
dybdocroot/views/papers/brainard/20030224.pdf.
29. See United Nations Population Fund, Giving Priority to Adolescents, UNPFA
STATE OF WORLD POPULATION 2003, at 51 (2003), at http://www.unfpa.org/swp/2003/
pdf/english/swp2003_eng.pdf.
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Another global initiative that mandates action is the proliferation of
small arms. Due to post-Cold War surplus, as many as 500 million small
arms are floating around the globe. Consequently, small arms are star-
tlingly cheap and easily accessible. 30 Combined with technological inno-
vations that make small arms more lethal and easier to use, this
proliferation facilitates the conversion of children into combatants.
Here too, though, the present Bush administration is out of step with
the international consensus in seeking to combat the proliferation of small
arms. 3 1 While the international community has worked to clamp down on
the illegal trade in light weapons, in recent years, the United States worked
the opposite end. The saddest illustration of this was the 2001 United
Nations (UN) Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms where, follow-
ing intense lobbying by the National Rifle Association (NRA), the United
States worked to counter any efforts to regulate the international trade of
small arms.
32
The U.S. administration and its NRA lobbyists (NRA board member
and U.S. Representative Bob Barr even attended the UN conference) have
conflated domestic gun control issues with those of international rela-
tions. 33 This is completely inappropriate, as none of these global efforts
would have impacted U.S. citizens' Second Amendment right to legally own
arms.3 4 Instead, they would have made the sales of machine guns and
rockets to non-state actors, such as rebel and terrorist groups who arm
children, more difficult. The fact that the United States was only joined by
Communist China and the Arab League in its opposition effort should
have been sufficient to set off alarms to reassess its odd position.
3 5
In addition to helping make the international weapons trade more
transparent, the United States and the international community should
make greater efforts to support, with both funding and technical assis-
tance, local initiatives that seek to control or reverse small arms prolifera-
tion. One example is through the setup of weapons collection programs in
postconflict states and states at risk of conflict. Such pilot programs have
enjoyed modest success in Albania and El Salvador and could succeed
elsewhere. 3 6
Problems of global development and violence, however, are broader
issues that merit their own study. The issue of child soldiers additionally
30. See JASJIT SINGH, LIGHT WEAPONS AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ix (1995); Edito-
rial, Missing the Target on Small Arms, THE JAPAN TIMES, July 25, 2001, available at http://
www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5?ed 20 0 10725al .htm.
31. Editorial, Missing the Target on Small Arms, supra note 30.
32. See Mei-Ling Hopgood, U.S. Says: Let World Bear Arms; Bush Won't OK Measures
To Ban Guns, ATLANTA CONSTITUTION, July 10, 2001, at Al.
33. See id.
34. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
35. Tamar Gebelnick, Small Arms: U.S., "Rogues" Hold Out, BULLETIN OF ATOMIC
SCIENTISTS, Oct. 2001, at 18.
36. See WILLIAM GODNICK & HELENA VAZQUEZ, SMALL ARMS CONTROL IN LATIN
AMERICA 9 (International Alert, Monitoring the Implementation of Small Arms Control
Project, Latin America Series No. 1, 2003), available at http://www.international-alert.
org/pdf/pubsec/SP-english.pdf.
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warrants action on a more specific front. In particular, the norms against
child soldiering have been exposed as insufficient. While most efforts
have focused on raising awareness of child soldier issues and bolstering the
laws against it, they have yet to really dent the popularity of the doctrine.
Stigmatization of groups which utilize children as soldiers must be rein-
forced with real punishments calculated to change their leaders'
calculations.
II. Talk Is Cheap
Recently, in the academic literature that studies international rela-
tions, many experts have written about the importance of beliefs about
right and wrong in shaping policy. They claim that beliefs shape actions,
even when they conflict with one's interests. 3 7 Such socially directed
behavior is described as being guided by a "norm," or what anthropologist
Paul Bohannan described as "a rule, more or less overt, which expresses
'ought' aspects of relationships between human beings. '"38
This research about the power of beliefs extends into the military
realm. Many have argued that "norms" about what is proper and improper
behavior on the battlefield still matter today. They argue, for instance, that
norms have limited the use of certain weapons that, while advantageous,
are horrific. For example, chemical and biological attacks might have been
quite useful in recent wars, but were considered so horrible in World War I
that the vast majority of nations have since refrained.3 9 Most recently,
activists have tried to harness this type of thinking by advocating the out-
law of weapons like the antipersonnel landmine. 40
However, the word "norm" can have two meanings. It can describe
ethical beliefs about proper behavior, but it can also describe the most
common practices of behavior, irrespective of ethics. 4 1 Thus, while people
writing about norms in international relations have focused on the posi-
tives of how ethics can lead to good behavior in warfare, they have ignored
the second aspect. Experts have written little about the darker side of
social behavior in warfare-the buildup of new, but malevolent, beliefs and
common practices. These new standards prescribe malicious behavior.
37. See generally JEFFREY LEGRO, COOPERATION UNDER FIRE: ANGLO-GERMAN RESTRAINT
DURING WORLD WAR 11 (1995); RICHARD PRICE, THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS TABOO (1997);
WARD THOMAS, EMBEDDED ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: NORMS AS CONSTRAINTS ON
THE USE OF FORCE (2002); Nina Tannenwald, The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and
the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use, 53 INT'L ORG. 433 (1999).
38. PAUL BOHANNAN, LAW AND WARFARE: STUDIES IN THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF CONFLICT
45 (1967).
39. PRICE, supra note 37.
40. See Richard Price, Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets
Land Mines, 52 INT'L ORG. 613, 617-19 (1998).
41. For example, in the IT world, a norm is defined as "(from norma, Latin for car-
penter's level) .. . a model of what should exist or be followed, or an average of what
currently does exist in some context, such as an average salary among members of a
large group," at http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/O,,sid9_gci2l47,O.html (last
visited July 11, 2004).
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Past decades of warfare have seen the breakdown of moral codes that
guided behavior in war. This has increased the savagery toward innocent
civilians, generally, and to children, specifically. 42 Yet little of the new
literature on norms confronts the issue of a proper response. Likewise,
most analysts have incorrectly assumed that non-state actors play a purely
positive role in developing the norms that direct common practice. 43 Being
separate from the state does not guarantee good behavior. It is true that
some non-state actors positively affect policy, such as the actors behind the
global campaign to eliminate landmines. However, immoral non-state
actors also exist, such as the Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda, whose
existence relies on the abduction and enslavement of children.
44
As the doctrine justifying the use of child soldiers has spread, the
most basic ethical injunctions against using children in war have rapidly
collapsed. Their failure was influenced primarily by technological and
geopolitical changes, with the result that children are now regular actors on
the battlefield. This indicates that the durability of ethical norms in the
face of external forces is far less powerful than believed. If ethical norms
are not sustainable, then their power is limited. Their failure also rein-
forces the argument that while common behavioral practices are often
grounded in moral principles, their strength is influenced by very real con-
textual factors, such as the environment. 45
This weakening of constraints may be particularly strong for non-state
armed groups, who are less influenced by moral norms. This conjecture is
similar to the theory of "realist" international relations scholars, who feel
that beliefs have no great role in politics. Instead, realists believe that
power and interests can best explain actions.
4 6
However, there is one important caveat to the realist argument. While
the rise of norms may be due to the power and interests of the strongest
42. See Singer, CHILDREN AT WAR (forthcoming), supra note 15, at ch. 1; MICHAEL
IGNATIEFF, THE WARRIOR'S HONOR: ETHNIC WAR AND THE MODERN CONSCIENCE (Henry
Holt and Co. 1998).
43. See, e.g., Price, supra note 40; MARTHA FINNEMORE, NATIONAL INTERESTS IN INTER-
NATIONAL SOCIETY 134 (1996).
44. The Scars of Death, Human Rights Watch Report (1997), at http://www.hrw.
org/reports97/uganda/2001 (last visited July 11, 2004); Peter Strandberg, End of a Long
Nightmare, MAIL & GuARIAN, July 26, 2002; Amnesty International, Breaking God's
Commands, at http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGAFR590011997 (last visited
July 11, 2004); Stavros Stavou & Robert Stewart, The Reintegration of Child Soldiers and
Abducted Children: A Case Study of Palaro and Pabbo Gulu District, in ACT AGAINST CHILD
SOLDIERS IN AFRICA: A READER (2002), at http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/BOOKS/ACTblurb.
html (last visited July 11, 2004); Against All Odds: Surviving the War on Adolescents, in
WOMEN'S COMMISSION FOR REFUGEE WOMEN AND CHILDREN REPORT, July 2001, at 6, at
http://www.womenscommission.org/pdf/ug.pdf (last visited July 11, 2004).
45. See Michael Desch, Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security
Studies, 23 INT'L SECURITY 141-70 (1998).
46. See KENNETH WALTZ, MAN, THE STATE AND WAR: A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS (1959);
THE USE OF FORCE: MILITARY POWER AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (Robert J. Art & Ken-
neth N. Waltz eds., 4th ed. 1993); BARRY BuZAN ET AL., THE LOGIC OF ANARCHY: NEOREAL-
ISM TO STRUCTURAL REALISM (1993); THE PERILS OF ANARCHY: CONTEMPORARY REALISM AND
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY (Michael E. Brown et al. eds., 1995).
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actors in the system (who receive most of the realists' focus), with the issue
of child soldiers, the normative breakdown was caused by the innovations
of some of the weakest actors in the international system. In fact, it was
because of their weakness that such groups chose to violate the old norms
against using children. Just as terrorist groups have revived fears of chemi-
cal and biological weapons use, the weaker parties have facilitated a new
standard of behavior for using child soldiers in contemporary warfare.
III. Lost Norms and Child Soldiers
Regardless of where one falls in the debate over the influence of
norms, the practice of using child soldiers indisputably violates widely-
accepted international beliefs about proper behavior. The human rights
abuses involved, which range from abduction and rape to torture and mur-
der, shock the conscience. Moreover, this practice violates the most ele-
mentary principles of international humanitarian law. Hence, the
challenge is to convert the international consensus against the use of chil-
dren as soldiers into action that revives the failing norm that children do
not belong on the battlefield.
The practice of the last four millennia of warfare, in itself, makes a
strong case for customary international law's proscription against child
soldiers. Furthermore, the twentieth century featured the signing of
numerous treaties that codified international law's norm against the use of
children in combat. These treaties include:
* 1924 League of Nations Declaration on the Rights of the Child,
* 1948 UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
* 1949 Geneva Conventions,
* 1950 European Convention on Human Rights,
* 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,
* 1966 UN Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights,
* 1969 American Convention on Human Rights,
* 1977 Additional Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions,
* 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights,
* 1984 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrad-
ing Treatment or Punishment,
* 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, and
* 1990 Organization on African Unity (OAU) African Charter on the Rights
and Welfare of the Child.
Of these, the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child was the most
notable and the most representative of global consensus. Indeed, it was the
most quickly and widely ratified international treaty ever, with over 190
state signatories. Article 38 pressured governments to take all feasible
measures to ensure that children do not directly participate in hostilities.
Despite international law's strong opposition to the practice, the child
soldier doctrine spread widely in the 1990s. 4 7 The international commu-
47. Singer, supra note 14, at 2.
Vol. 37
2004 Talk is Cheap
nity's response, however, was to condemn the practice and codify the use
of child soldiers as a specific violation of the law. The United Nations even
created an office of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General
for Children and Armed Conflict to investigate and lobby for children's
rights in warfare. Former Ugandan diplomat Olara Otunnu currently
holds this position.48
The major impetus behind these efforts was a group of geographically
diverse NGOs, united under the umbrella of the Coalition to Stop the Use of
Child Soldiers. The Coalition was formed in May 1998 by several leading
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs): Amnesty International, Human
Rights Watch, Defence for Children International, International Save the
Children Alliance, Jesuit Refugee Service, the Quaker United Nations
Office in Geneva, International Federation Terre des Hommes, and World
Vision International. Over the next few years, it built up a global network
of interested NGOs, aid agencies, research institutes, and other linked
coalitions willing to stand against the use of child soldiers.
49
A major part of the Coalition's strategy was to generate consensus and
enact treaties against the practice of child soldiering beginning at the state
and regional levels. This endeavor was quite successful and eventually led
to the mobilization of campaigns in over forty different countries. These
efforts resulted in a series of regional agreements that currently encompass
much of the globe, including:
* 1996 OAU Resolution on the Plight of African Children in Situation of
Armed Conflicts,
* 1997 The Capetown Principles,
* 1998 European Parliament Resolution on Child Soldiers,
* 1999 Declaration by the Nordic Foreign Ministers Against the Use of
Child Soldiers,
* 1999 Berlin Declaration on the Use of Children as Soldiers,
* 1999 Montevideo Declaration on the Use of Children as Soldiers,
* 1999 Maputo Declaration on the Use of Children as Soldiers,
* 2000 Organization of American States (OAS) Resolution on Children and
Armed Conflict, and
* 2001 Amman Declaration on the Use of Children as Soldiers.
The group successfully pushed for international condemnation of the
practice. In 1999, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1261,
which condemned the targeting of children in armed conflict, including
their recruitment and use as soldiers. 50 In 2000, the UN General Assembly
adopted an "Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the
Child."5 1 This protocol significantly amended the 1989 treaty in order to
confront the issue of child soldiers. Principally, it raised the age at which
48. For more information, see www.un.org/special-rep/children-armed-conflict (last
visited July 11, 2004).
49. See generally http://www.childsoldiers.org (discussing the founding of the
Coalition).
50. S.C. Res. 1261, U.N. SCOR, 4037th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1261 (1999).
51. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involve-
ment of Children in Armed Conflict, May 25, 2000, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., U.N. Doc.
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direct participation in conflict is legally permitted from fifteen to eighteen
years old.5 2 It also banned compulsory recruitment of any child younger
than eighteen years old, and explicitly included non-state actors within its
coverage.5 3 With intense lobbying, the treaty was quickly adopted and
entered into force on February 12, 2002. As of February 2004, the treaty
had been signed by 115 parties and ratified by 62.54
Thus, as a result of the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers and
other international actors, a series of international regimes have buttressed
the ethical norms against child soldiering. The UN Special Representative,
Olara Ottunu, has also directly attempted to convince conflict groups to
stop using children. He personally met with rebel group leaders in over
twenty countries to negotiate the end of the practice. In January 2003, the
treaty was followed up by UN Resolution 1460, which called on a list of
specific child soldier groups in five countries (Afghanistan, D.R.C.,
Burundi, Liberia, and Somalia) to halt the practice and provide the Security
Council with a report of the steps they have taken. 5 5
Ethical norms are clearly important in providing the standards that
are intended to guide behavior. Proponents of the legal effort against child
soldiering point to five key strengths of this activism: (1) it established an
international standard on the employment of child soldiers; (2) codified
legal norms; (3) set minimum age requirements that are more difficult to
fabricate; (4) encouraged states to implement the laws; and (5) raised pub-
lic awareness, both in the West and in areas where the child soldier groups
were active-potentially empowering greater activism.5 6
One should not, however, confound ethical norms with actual behav-
ior or enforcement. Unfortunately, all of the international attention and
condemnation of child soldiers has not translated into an end to the prac-
tice. Throughout the process, the use of child soldiers on an international
scale did not diminish, but instead spread further still. Indeed, many of
the same countries that signed the various treaties continue to flout their
obligations. This is evidenced by the fact that while there are over 100
signatories, child soldiers still exist in roughly 85 countries.5 7 Indeed,
some of the largest known users of child soldiers, such as the various child
soldier groups fighting in Myanmar, Colombia, and Uganda, were not even
on the specific Resolution 1460 list released by the UN in early 2003.58
A/RES/54/263 (2000), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/6/protocol
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54. See UNICEF, Convention on the Rights of the Child, at http://www.unicef.org/
crc/crc.htm (last visited July 11, 2004).
55. S.C. Res. 1460, U.N. SCOR, 4695th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1460 (2003).
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SECURITY & DEv. 137 (2002), available at http://www.cdi.org/document/attachment/
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Moreover, the new protocol and the meetings with Mr. Ottunu have
failed to sway the rebel groups from using child soldiers. Typically, after a
period of public denial, these groups would pledge to stop using children
as soldiers, in an effort to garner international goodwill and aid. However,
they would not change their actual practices. For example, despite multiple
meetings with the United Nations, a ceasefire process, and multiple public
pledges to stop, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) has continued
to conscript children younger than seventeen years old.5 9 Similar discrep-
ancies between pledges and practices have occurred with Unido Nacional
para a Independncia Total de Angola (UNITA) in Angola, the Revolution-
ary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and National Liberation Army
(ELN) in Colombia, the Kamajors in Sierra Leone, Lal Sena in Nepal, the
D.R.C. government and its rebel opponents in the Congo, and the Taliban
in Afghanistan.60 For instance, one rebel group in the D.R.C. pledged not
to use child soldiers in February 2001. Just a few weeks later, it celebrated
its recent military training graduates and over 1,800 of the new graduates
were between the ages of twelve and eighteen.6 1 In fact, over the next two
years the reported rate of child soldier recruitment actually accelerated in
some provinces of the D.R.C.
62
Indeed, the only change for some groups resulting from this lobbying
effort against child soldiers was simply to try to better hide the practice.
For example, when they first entered the Afghan civil war in 1994, the fun-
damentalist Taliban primarily recruited young Afghan refugees attending
Pakistani madrassashs. Following international pressure, the leader of the
Taliban, Mullah Omar, made a public decree in 1998 that any of his follow-
ers who had not yet grown a beard were too young and should leave the
force. Omar declared that he would punish any commander who used
child soldiers. Just one year later, the UN reported that Taliban offensives
were using between 2,000 and 5,000 children bused over from the religious
schools, many preadolescent. 63 Likewise, Renamo in Mozambique stead-
fastly denied its use of children throughout its war with the government.
At the war's end, though, many of its marchers in demobilization parades
were children, including one sixteen-year-old who had been fighting since
he was eight.64
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Abduct More Children To Be Soldiers: Truce Monitors, XINHUA, Oct. 12, 2003, available at
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60. Singer, CHILDREN AT WAR (forthcoming), supra note 15, at ch. 8.
61. Interview with human rights expert from D.R.C. (June 2002).
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63. International Rescue Committee, WATCHLIST ON CHILDREN AND ARMED CONFLICT
NEWSLETTER, Nov. 2001, at www.theirc.org.
64. Jacky Mamou, Soldier Boys and Girls, LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, Sept. 2001, at
www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2001/09/13soldiers.
Cornell International Law Journal
Other groups carry out token child soldier demobilizations for public
relations purposes. For example, in 2001 the Congolese Rally for Democ-
racy (RCD) Goma group in the Eastern Congo set up a "commission" on
the demobilization and reintegration of child soldiers: However, only the
most sickly or difficult recruits were released.6 5 In 2003, it again promised
the UN that it would release its estimated 2,600 child soldiers. However,
when it came time to demobilize, only 104 child soldiers (less than 5 per-
cent) were actually released.6 6 Most recently, the group has moved its
training camps to less accessible regions to minimize even the token inter-
ference from outside observers. Similarly, the Sudan People's Liberation
Army (SPLA) had a large public ceremony in 2001, releasing 3,500 claimed
child soldiers to great fanfare before the UN and international media. Of
course, most of the children were later reported to have not been child
soldiers (the real underage fighters were elsewhere) and the organization
soon admitted having close to another 10,000 still within its ranks. 6 7 Per-
haps the most bizarre example of this denial strategy is the Lord's Resis-
tance Army in Uganda (LRA). A quasi-religious cult group, the LRA is
fighting to revive respect for the biblical Ten Commandments, and whose
practices includes the torture, rape, and killing of children, the use of sex
slaves, and the prohibition of bicycles. 68 With a core of 200 believers, but
fielding a force of up to 12,000 abducted children, the LRA almost single-
handedly exists through its use of child soldiers, but now has a website
that denies the practice. 6 9
Consequently, while most groups no longer publicly extol their
recruitment of children, the doctrine behind the use of child soldiers has
continued to spread. Counterefforts have meant that the recruitment of
children is no longer a source of pride (for example, the now defunct
Farabundo Marti National Liberation (FMLN) in El Salvador once com-
plained that it was excluded from an article in Time magazine about child
soldier groups). 70 All the same, however, groups continue to use children
as soldiers.
IV. Turning Outrage into Action
Several simple actions can be taken that would make the practice of
using child soldiers more difficult. These include support for expanding
the availability of birth records to help children and families become better
able to document ages (many children are abducted because they cannot
65. Child Soldiers in the Congo: Business as Usual, REFUGEES INTERNATIONAL, Apr. 1,
2001; Child Soldiers in Eastern Congo, REFUGEES INTERNATIONAL, Apr. 30, 2001.
66. Interview with human rights expert (June 2003).
67. Interview with human rights expert (June 2002).
68. Breaking God's Commands, supra note 44.
69. See www.spacegroove.com/jospehkony (last visited July 11, 2004). It has a mes-
sage of greeting from Kony and also a page on "Why democracy will tr[u]mp under Maj.
Gen. Joseph Kony's powerful[ ] leadership of LRA and it's [sic] powerful[] Political
System."
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legally prove that they are underage). Moreover, aid to local religious and
community leaders and NGOs can help such advocates appeal against the
practice on the basis of local values and customs. Aid agencies and NGOs
can also help distribute the aforementioned international agreements
throughout child soldier zones to help spread the word that the interna-
tional community condemns this illegitimate practice. Another avenue is
to reach out to particular at-risk groups, such as refugees and street chil-
dren, to counter the propaganda that often manipulates them into volun-
teering. Customary efforts aimed simply at spreading the news of treaties
have been and will continue to be insufficient.
The crux of the problem is that groups deciding to adopt the child
soldier doctrine have never been ignorant about whether it was the ethical
thing to do or confused as to what exactly was allowed under international
law or norms of proper behavior. The codes against using children as
soldiers have existed for thousands of years. Groups who have, brought
children into warfare know that they are violating a moral code. As just.
one illustration, the LTTE has one of the most systemized approaches in its
execution of the child soldier doctrine-ranging from sophisticated recruit-
ing strategies using computer databases to a complicated structure of train-
ing camps and deployment strategies. 7 1 However, even this group
pointedly omits the dates of birth on the headstones of its child soldiers,
knowing that history will harshly judge their exploitation of these
children. 72
Those who use child soldiers are, by definition, willing to ignore and
transgress longstanding ethical norms and will likely be unswayed by new
ones.7 3 Those who abduct children, send them into battle, and force them
to commit rape and murder are simply unlikely to be persuaded by moral
appeals. One cannot shame the shameless.
Governments and groups interested in preventing the use of child
soldiers must realize that the employment of children as soldiers reflects
the use of a well-planned doctrine, resulting from conscious and deliberate
decisions. Unless the international community can alter the real calcula-
tions and conditions that led to this choice, the prohibitions against child
soldiering will be as empty and continually violated as the new, largely
symbolic prohibitions against. landmines. Groups will continue to use
child soldiers. In short, making laws is not the same as finding ways to
enforce them.
This realization may be sobering to the global activist movement, but
all is not hopeless. Indeed, there are a number of feasible steps that could
turn the ethical norms against child soldiers back into standard practice.
Each represents a true possibility within the realm of policymaking; in gen-
eral, they only lack the requisite level of attention and political will, which
can be mobilized.
71. Rohan Gunaratna, LTTE Child Combatants, JANES INTELLIGENCE REVIEW, July
1998.
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The first feature of a program to weaken the practice of child soldiers
is that it must be smart and judicious. Any effort to stop a global practice
inherently faces an uphill battle. Thus, if possible, a program must try to
make the biggest difference in children's lives. One aspect of this is to
focus on the worst abuses, as a shrewd use of the limited political capital
and attention at hand. While all uses of children under the age of eighteen
as soldiers are wrong, not all are equal.
The groups working to stop the use of child soldiers are motivated by
noble ideals but too often have been distracted by other political agendas.
Thus, they have often squandered their valuable energy and capital. This
lack of focus has hampered efforts and often backfired. For example, while
an international coalition has been built, anti-American prejudices too
often misdirect the underlying mission to stop the use of children as
soldiers.
In particular, the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers has
wasted its political capital by engaging in a long drawn out public relations
war with the U.S. and British governments. If the group had been more
strategic in its thinking, these global powers could have been among its
leading supporters. The crux of the dispute was over the presence of a
small number of seventeen-year-old recruits in their forces (00.24% of the
U.S. military), who had volunteered with parental permission. While this
practice may not be agreeable to all of the varied members of the coalition,
it is certainly not the same as the LRA abducting children and forcing them
to slaughter their own families. Despite this, the group made the U.S. pol-
icy a focus of its lobbying efforts. Its annual report listed the two practices
(the U.S. policy and the LRA abductions) as equivalent abuses under the
same heading.74
If the underlying intent is to aid those children most in need, such
verbal jabs at the United States and Britain were completely wasteful and
ineffective. The groups created instant opposition among those in the poli-
cymaking establishment that are most capable of helping and wasted the
groups' limited political capital. The result was that the coalition devel-
oped an adversarial relationship with the U.S. government, the Defense
Department in particular. Consequently, the United States delayed ratifi-
cation of the treaty until the end of 2002. More importantly, the groups
damaged the cause's long-term relationship with the world superpower.
Sadly, this feud was unnecessary. U.S. law is already so protective of
parental rights that the various treaties changed little. For example, of the
1,400 U.S. military personnel who were under eighteen years old and
74. The Coalition's annual report also compares sexual crimes that are not
equivalent. It likened the FARC's "sexual freedom" policy, which includes forcing young
girl soldiers to wear interuterine devices and even killing a 15-year-old who got pregnant
regardless, with a single incident in 1997, when an intoxicated British Army drill
instructor raped a recruit (the drill instructor was later imprisoned for the crime). While
both actions are inexcusable, there is a distinct difference between the overall policy of
an entire organization and the deviant behavior of an individual within an organization,
who is then properly punished. CoALTON TO STOP THE USE OF CHILD SOLDIERS, CHILD
SOLDIERS: AN OvERvIEw (2001).
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assigned to active units in 2002, only 45 were assigned to units overseas.
The essential reason is that while seventeen-year-olds may join the U.S. mil-
itary upon their high school graduation, by the time they make it through
boot camp and then advanced skills training, they will have aged past eigh-
teen. 75 A compromise has since been worked out (the small number of
underage soldiers actually overseas are now prohibited from entering into
combat and pulled out from their units before deployments), but valuable
time was lost. Given the increasing U.S. involvement in issues surrounding
child soldiers, relations with the U.S. military community needs to be
reaffirmed.
The focus of groups working to stop the use of child soldiers should
turn from standard-setting and borderline issues to the heart of the matter.
If the advocacy community hopes to ultimately make a difference, it must
seek to change the present practices of the most offensive abusers. To
accomplish this, it must move from moral excoriation to changing the polit-
ical and economic calculations that actually lead to the exploitation of chil-
dren. In military parlance, if it wants to defeat child soldier users, it must
infiltrate their "decision cycle. ' 7 6
V. The Legal Angle
Groups do not accidentally choose to use child soldiers, nor are they
motivated by pure malice. They have underlying interests and have deliber-
ately set up special processes for the recruitment, indoctrination, and utili-
zation of child soldiers because they believe they will draw certain
advantages from the practice. 7 7 These calculations must be altered in
order to defeat the overall habit of using child soldiers.
One strategy is to criminalize the practice. The legal transgressions
involved in child soldiering are almost too numerous to make an exhaus-
tive list. The use of child soldiers has violated the laws of war for over four
millennia. Indeed, as one expert notes of child soldier commanders in the
D.R.C., "[tihey know it's a war crime, but they seem to believe they'll never
be brought to justice. There is a sense of rampant impunity."78 The prob-
lem is that, so far, these commanders have been correct.
Given the number of treaties and legal compacts that this practice vio-
lates, there is no need for additional international law in this arena.
Rather, the full measure of international law needs to be applied to elimi-
nate the sense of impunity enjoyed by those leaders who use child soldiers.
Two legal pathways offer hope in this area. Both entail treating the use
of child soldiers as a war crime in and of itself and prosecuting the leaders
75. Vince Crawley, 17-Year-Old Soldiers Can't Be 'Trigger Pullers,' ARMY TIMES, Mar.
18, 2002, at 25.
76. This philosophy is known as the Boyd or OODA (Observation-Orientation-
Decision-Action) loop, first established by Col. John Boyd. See GRANT T. HAMMOND, THE
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responsible for the explicit recruitment and use of children. Both involve
setting a legal precedent that punishes the practice.
Treating the practice itself as a war crime would also lower the bar for
prosecution. That is, the widespread presence of child soldiers within an
organization would be fairly easy to prove, as compared to the current high
legal burden of proof that leaders must be aware of individual acts by their
soldiers. For example, leaders of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) or
LRA may successfully distance themselves from certain massacres by say-
ing they were elsewhere or didn't know of the actions committed by their
subordinates. However, they could never claim ignorance of the fact that
the majority of their soldiers were underage.
Moreover, the criminalization of the practice would make it binding on
other states to turn over any leaders who have escaped across state bounda-
ries. This would also apply to their assets, which might have been acquired
through the use of child soldiers. Notably, non-state groups do not escape
the jurisdiction of these laws. Like all governments, they are bound by the
basic principles of international law and required to respect all four
Geneva Conventions, even in internal conflicts.
The first means for carrying out such a program is through the estab-
lishment of ad hoc international tribunals in response to egregious con-
flicts, such as the most recent war crimes tribunal in Sierra Leone. 79
Prosecuting former leaders of the RUF and the Civil Defence Forces (CDF),
who are now in custody for various war crimes, including the specific
crime of recruiting and using child soldiers, is an important first step.
As with many woefully underfunded international initiatives, these ad-
hoc courts also merit greater support from the donor community. The
Sierra Leone Court's budget has already been reduced from its originally
estimated needs of $114 million to a much smaller amount of $57 mil-
lion.80 The donor community should increase its support of the Court,
with the proviso that the court uses its special position to break new
ground in the battle against child soldiers. The Court may also consider
prosecuting foreign facilitators of the child soldier practice in Sierra Leone,
including now exiled Liberian leader Charles Taylor, as well as those who
dealt with him. Any amnesty offers for such leaders in the interests of
peace must be balanced against the costs of reinforcing the leaders' sense
of impunity.
Thus far, the ad hoc tribunals have been geographically-centered,
focusing on conflicts in Sierra Leone, Rwanda, and the former Yugoslavia.
However, the reach of the tribunals transcends state borders. For example,
the tribunals have indicted war criminals who took refuge outside the
79. Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on
the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, Jan. 16, 2002, available at http://
www.sc-sl.org.
80. War Crimes Tribunal in Sierra Leone, CHILD SOLDIERs NEWSLE=tER, Mar. 2002, at
20, available at http://www.child-soldiers.org/cs/childsoldiers.nsf/0/9ca132295e19c57
d80256b7e0O2f240e/$FILE/CSNewsletterMarch2002.doc.
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countries where their crimes originally took place. 8 ' This provides the
potential for a new mode in the use of ad hoc tribunals. One idea that
merits exploration is the UN Security Council convening a new issue-cen-
tered tribunal that would tackle the international child soldier problem.
The structure of such a tribunal would resemble previous tribunals, but the
new version would seek out offenders regardless of where the crime was
committed. Admittedly, such a new direction for ad hoc tribunals would
be highly controversial. The new tribunals would likely only be approved if
the crime was widely agreed upon and met with inconvertible proof. Inter-
national opprobrium against the use of child soldiers and the prior investi-
gative evidence gathered by the UN could provide such an opening.
The second avenue for constructing legal deterrents against the use of
the child soldiers would be to make the structure of the International Crim-
inal Court (ICC) more permanent.8 2 Signed by 139 countries, the Court
seeks to establish a global system of punishment for those that violate the
laws of war and go unpunished by their own countries. In particular, the
Court has jurisdiction over the use of child soldiers in both international 8 3
and noninternational armed conflicts.
8 4
Unfortunately, the United States, with unlikely allies of Iraq and
China, decided to withdraw from the treaty that set up the Court.8 5 It has
also worked diplomatically to undermine the court's authority and set up a
series of bilateral agreements that exclude its own citizens from coverage;
countries which refuse to sign are threatened with the loss of aid.8 6 Some
Americans were concerned that the international court would somehow
overrun U.S. law and that American soldiers might be targeted for
politicized prosecution for war crimes. 8 7
Within the United States, this concern has been greatly overblown and
reflects a minority's general suspicions of international institutions. Their
81. See, e.g., Indictments of Ratko Mladic & Radovan Karadzic, IT-95-5/18-I, The
International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia, available at http://www.un.org/
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mistaken view is that international law is about capturing and punishing
evil leaders who would otherwise escape, rather than about putting pres-
sure on soldiers performing their duties. The United States, however,
could play a key role in selecting the ICC judges and prosecutors. In addi-
tion, a number of procedural standards in the Court's bylaws would make
politically-motivated prosecutions nearly impossible.8 8 Respect for domes-
tic laws is at the basis of all of the court's bylaws, such that as long as a
nation followed its own laws in the investigation of suspected crimes
(which the United States would surely do), the international court would
not possess the power to intervene.
American opposition to the prosecution of war crimes is shortsighted
and runs counter to the traditional strategic goals of American foreign pol-
icy. The United States once sought to build international institutions as a
means of extending global justice, peace, and stability. Now it seeks to tear
them down. Benjamin Ferencz, one of the last surviving American military
prosecutors at the Nuremberg trials, is among those who worry about the
loss of the ideals that won the Second World War. Speaking at the opening
of the ICC, he noted, "The current leadership of the United States seems to
have forgotten the lessons that we tried to teach the rest of the world."8 9
Without U.S. support, the Court will likely be doomed, just as the
absence of the world's leading power doomed the League of Nations.90
Given the benefits of establishing accountability and ending the impunity
of war criminals, the United States should reconsider its abandonment of
international legal institutions. These establishments will not only help
ensure that those who abuse children are punished, but also return the
United States to its noble, decades-long tradition of leading international
institutions, rather than undercutting them because of the overblown fears
of a few conspiracy theorists.
The United States, as well as other members of the international com-
munity, should also support modifications to the ICC that will convert it
into a more effective tool to combat the use of child soldiers. For example,
the Court's rules might be amended, in order to allow children to testify
before the Court, to allow direct sufferers to bring the practice to the fore.
Another possibility would be to convene a tribunal to indict and prosecute
those presently using child soldiers around the globe, not just address the
aftermath of specific wars. The international community should not wait
for the termination of a war crime before prosecuting those responsible.
The ICC could start by indicting the leaders of twenty-three warring
groups that have been found by the UN Secretary-General to be using child
soldiers. Targeting the global child soldier practice might be an excellent
88. For instance, it can only act where states are themselves either unable or unwill-
ing to do so, and the Prosecutor can only proceed with a full investigation after seeking
the approval of a pre-trial chamber. See Rome Statute, supra note 82.
89. World Criminal Court Launched, REUTERS, Mar. 11, 2003, available at http://www.
cnn.com/2003/WORLD/europe/03/11/warcrimes.court.reut. (last visited July 12,
2004).
90. For a discussion of this episode in history, see J.M COOPER, BREAKING THE HEART
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Marbury vs. Madison for an already besieged Court seeking to establish its
credibility and standing.
The purpose of this program of criminalization would be to affect the
decisional calculus behind the use of child soldiers. The use of children as
a weapon of war would become like the use of chemical or biological weap-
ons-simply unacceptable to the entire world, under any circumstances.
Those groups that consciously choose to transgress international law
would then open themselves up to the risk of prosecutions, sanctions, and
asset seizures. Such prosecution must be judicious enough to limit their
focus to those who were in leadership positions, either politically or milita-
rily, and not waste time and effort on followers. The idea behind criminal-
ization and prosecution is not revenge, but deterrence.
The tribunals and the ICC face a particularly difficult question in
deciding whether to prosecute children who committed mass atrocities
while serving in a conflict. Many of these children were abducted, abused,
and often forcibly put under the influence of drugs. 9 1 When determining
punishment for criminal behavior, it is generally recognized that, as
expressed by Florida Governor Jeb Bush (brother of the current U.S. Presi-
dent), "There is a different standard for children. There should be some
sensitivity that a 14-year-old is not a little adult."'9 2 Likewise, the U.S.
Supreme Court has ruled that capital punishment is not an option for
those under the age of sixteen (unless a state statute specifies otherwise),
as they lack the proper judgment skills to be held accountable as adults. 93
This ruling should also be considered as the United States seeks to
determine the status of the underage detainees being held at Guantanamo
Bay. At least five young boys between the ages of thirteen and sixteen have
been captured by U.S. forces in the War on Terror.9 4 They are housed in a
special wing of the detainee facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, entitled
"Camp Iguana."9 5
While the United States may have found these child soldiers to be "ille-
gal combatants," the United States should follow the spirit of the pertinent
laws in their treatment and punishment. For example, Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld has stated that "these are not children" and thus
can be treated in the same manner as the rest of the adult detainees.
9 6
However, this position is contrary to national and international law, as well
as general public sentiment.
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Regardless of their crimes, children younger than eighteen years old
are different than adults on a wide range of emotional, physical, social,
political and legal levels. Consequently, these children should be held in
separate areas until the courts can determine their guilt and punishment.
More pertinently, the question of holding children in prison simply does
not fall under either the job description or expertise of the Secretary of
Defense. Likewise, while the U.S. military has treated these young prison-
ers well (the juvenile detainees at Camp Iguana live in a compound set on
the beach, complete with a TV room to watch videos-The Call of the Wild
and White Fang being reported favorites-and a sports playing area), 9 7 the
business of running a youth prison is not good for the U.S. military.9 8 The
best solution is to turn these children over to the governments of their
home states, with arrangements in place to ensure their rehabilitation and
to prevent their re-recruitment by terrorist groups.
The same considerations are true when dealing with horrible war
crimes. The goal of deterrence is secondary with child soldiers. The
needed factors of intent and awareness of the consequences are not the
same for child soldiers themselves or for future recruits. 99 International
legal norms also find that criminal responsibility may be excluded in cases
where there is duress caused by threats of harm or death or where there is
the influence of intoxication, 10 0 all of which occur often with child
soldiers. 101
The strategy recently adopted in Sierra Leone toward child soldier per-
petrators seems best suited both to serve the interests of the victims and
also to promote long-term stability and societal recovery. While the stat-
utes of the Special Court do allow for the prosecution of those between the
ages of fifteen and eighteen, the prosecutor has not yet taken such action,
instead focusing his efforts on the adult leaders.' 0 2 Children implicated in
particularly heinous crimes are given hearings in special closed juvenile
chambers (to keep their identity secret) and receive psychological counsel-
ing and other forms of assistance. Rather than having to serve sentences in
prisons with adult perpetrators, they are placed in special custody, rehabili-
tation or demobilization programs, and foster care. 10 3 This response ade-
quately recognizes the unique nature of child soldiering-where the
perpetrators are also the victims. 10 4
97. Gibbs, supra note 95, at 43.
98. Id.
99. Christina Clark, Juvenile Justice and Child Soldiering: Trends, Dilemmas, Chal-
lenges, CHILD SOLDIERS NEWSLETTER, Mar. 2003, at 6, available at http://www.child-
soldiers.org/cs/childsoldiers.nsf/fffdbd058ae1d99d8O256adcOO5c2bb8/40dd438aO868
fcb480256cdf0058f3d8?.
100. Id. at 7 (citing the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 31).
101. Ismene Zarifis, Sierra Leone's Search for Justice and Accountability of Child
Soldiers, 9 HUM. RTs. BRIEF 18 (2002).
102. Agreement, supra note 79.
103. The Special Court for Sierra Leone, The Special Court Made Simple, available at
http://www.sc-sl.org.
104. Amnesty International, Child Soldiers: Criminals or Victims? (Dec. 2000).
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VI. Taking Action, Indirectly but Effectively
Building a system of deterrence, including criminalization of the over-
all practice, produces a greater menu of indirect, yet still tangible, actions
that can be taken against those who use child soldiers. Criminalization
also allows activists to use domestic courts to pressure countries to adhere
to their own legal standards. It further pressures the UN to disallow agree-
ments with states that are known to use child soldiers.
First, criminalization renders less tenable the contradictory policies
toward children and war that many states now have. A number of states
which do not directly use child soldiers supply aid and weapons to those
groups and states that do entertain such practices. These include many
signatories to the treaties banning child soldiers. One example is the mili-
tary and economic support that China, Malaysia, India, and Canada give to
Sudan.10 5 Another example is the military training and assistance that
Rwanda and Uganda give to endemic child soldier users such as the RCD
group in Congo.106
Establishing the practice itself as a war crime would make such poli-
cies more difficult to support because states would be less willing to associ-
ate themselves with war criminals, either directly or indirectly. The
removal of these support structures could provide a valuable mechanism to
convince groups and governments that it is no longer advantageous to util-
ize children in combat.
Criminalization would also provide a new impetus to limiting the
small arms trade to non-state actors. The easy availability of weapons and
their low cost makes the use of child soldiers possible. 10 7 In many cases,
this will involve simply targeting illicit arms dealers, who are often well
known to authorities. 10 8 Other priorities relating to enforcement include
the destruction of surplus small arms and the improved management of
stockpiles.
Of particular note is that the United States is both a signatory to the
various legal regimes against child soldiers and has often sought to aid
child victims of war. For example, the United States provides millions of
dollars in aid to displaced children and war victims in places like Afghani-
stan, Angola, Congo, Croatia, Mozambique and Uganda; since 1995, it has
spent another $230 million to fight international child labor practices. 10 9
However, at the same time, it has often turned a blind eye toward the use of
child soldiers by its military trading partners. During the 1990s, it aver-
105. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SUDAN, OIL, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 510-51, 605-25
(2003); Katy Salmon, Fueling the Killing Fields, GLOBAL INFORMATION NETWORK, July
2002, at http://www.indiatogether.org/humanrights/articles/sudan-ongc.html.
106. Sam Kiley, Chaos and Cannibalism Under Congo's Bloody Shies, THE OBSERVER,
Aug. 17, 2003, at 22.
107. Singer, supra note 14.
108. Brian Wood &Johan Peleman, The Arms Fixers, PRIO REPORT, Mar. 1999, at 1;
Jakkie Cilliers & Christian Dietrich, Angola's War Economy, INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUD-
IES REPORT, 2000.
109. U.S. Department of Labor Conference on Child Soldiers, Children in the Crossfire
(May 2003), available at http://www.childsoldiers.us/factsheet.html.
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aged an annual transfer of a quarter of a billion dollars of military weapons
and training to state armed forces that used children sixteen and under
and another quarter of a billion dollars in foreign and commercial military
sales; these erring partners ranged from Colombia to Rwanda. I l0 The war
on terrorism has expanded military aid, likely increasing these figures. In
2004, Colombia alone is slated to receive nearly $750 million in U.S.
aid.1 11
In the United States, activists already possess the necessary legal
means. To remain in compliance with the Leahy Amendment, American
military training is withheld from those foreign units found to abuse
human rights. 112 It must be ensured that the human rights screening
required by the Leahy Amendment includes monitoring and prohibiting
the use of child soldiers.
Fair labor laws may be another indirect means to alter the decisional
calculus of child soldier groups. The International Labor Organization
(ILO) has long considered child soldiering to constitute one of the worst
forms of child labor and lists it as a form of slavery over abducted children.
In 1973, the ILO Minimum Age Convention provided that eighteen years
old was the minimum age for participation in hazardous labor, which cer-
tainly includes serving as a soldier. 113 The 1999 ILO Worst Forms of
Child Labour Convention prohibited forced or compulsory recruitment of
anyone under the age of eighteen. 114
110. Stohl, supra note 56.
111. The Center For International Policy's Colombia Program, U.S. Aid to Colombia
Since 1997, available at http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/aidtable.htm.
112. None of the funds made available by this Act may be provided to any unit of
the security forces of a foreign country if the Secretary of State has credible
evidence that such unit has committed gross violations of human rights, unless
the Secretary determines and reports to the Committees on Appropriations that
the government of such country is taking effective measures to bring the respon-
sible members of the security forces unit to justice.
The Leahy Law, Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, 2001, P.L. 106-429, § 563, avail-
able at http://www.ciponline.org/facts/leahy.html.
113. Minimum Age Convention 138, June 26,1973, art. 3.1, available at http://www.
ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C138 ("The minimum age for admission to any type of
employment or work which by its nature or the circumstances in which it is carried out
is likely to jeopardise the health, safety or morals of young persons shall not be less than
18 years.").
114. Art. 2: For the purposes of this Convention, the term child shall apply to all
persons under the age of 18.
Art. 3: For the purposes of this Convention, the term the worst forms of child
labour comprises:
(a) all forms of slavery or practices similar to slavery, such as the sale and
trafficking of children, debt bondage and serfdom and forced or compulsory
labour, including forced or compulsory recruitment of children for use in
armed conflict;
(b) the use, procuring or offering of a child for prostitution, for the produc-
tion of pornography or for pornographic performances;
(c) the use, procuring or offering of a child for illicit activities, in particular
for the production and trafficking of drugs as defined in the relevant interna-
tional treaties;
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Groups that use child soldiers should be treated in the same manner
as any other international actors that violate these most basic labor stan-
dards. Activists should stop pressing for the formation of new interna-
tional agreements and start seeking to exact real costs on violators based
on the existing ones. Activists should emulate the antiapartheid and
antichild labor movements, and explore the strategies of stigmatization and
boycott.
One tactic would be to target the trading partners of states and groups
that follow such practices. Indeed, the problem of child soldiers is often
most acute in countries that possess rich natural resources. Moreover, the
practice is often driven by groups that seek to exploit the trade in these
resources to gain riches. Examples include Charles Taylor's takeover of the
timber and rubber trade in Liberia and the RUF's attempts to control the
Sierra Leone diamond trade during the West African wars.1 15 During this
period, French, Belgian, Chinese, Taiwanese, and Turkish businesses con-
ducted a lucrative trade that fueled the fighting and the continued use of
child soldiers. 116 A significant portion of this trade eventually reached
U.S. markets.1 17 Similarly, some eighty-five Western corporations are
thought to have been involved in the illegal trades connected to the war in
the Congo.' 18
(d) work which, by its nature or the circumstances in which it is carried out,
is likely to harm the health, safety or morals of children.
Art. 7:
1. Each Member shall take all necessary measures to ensure the effective
implementation and enforcement of the provisions giving effect to this Con-
vention including the provision and application of penal sanctions or, as
appropriate, other sanctions.
2. Each Member shall, taking into account the importance of education in
eliminating child labour, take effective and time-bound measures to:
(a) prevent the engagement of children in the worst forms of child labour;
(b) provide the necessary and appropriate direct assistance for the removal
of children from the worst forms of child labour and for their rehabilitation
and social integration; [and]
(c) ensure access to free basic education, and, wherever possible and appro-
priate, vocational training, for all children removed from the worst forms of
child labour ....
Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention 182, June 17, 1999, available at http://www.
ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C 182.
115. Emmanuel Kwesi Aning, Regulating Illicit Trade in Natural Resources: The Role of
Regional Actors in West Africa, 95 REV. AFR. POL. ECON. 99, 101, 104 (2003).
116. Id. at 101.
117. See Emmanuel Kwesi Aning, Regulating Illicit Trade in Natural Resources,
GHANAIAN CHRONICLE, Nov. 24, 2003; How UN Has 'Rewarded' President of Liberia,
FINANCIAL TIMES, July 1, 2003, at 14; William Kistner, Timber, Taylor . . . Guns and
Money, CHRIsTIAN SCi. MONITOR, July 23, 2003, at 9. Just as an illustration, French and
Chinese companies imported $13 million worth of illicit Liberian timber from Taylor in
the period from January to June 2000. Aning, supra note 115. In turn, it is thought that
15% of two species of wood used in American flooring products came from Liberia.
Kistner, supra.
118. Declan Walsh, UN Cuts Details of Western Profiteers from Congo Report, THE INDE-
PENDENT, Oct. 27, 2003, at 10.
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Given that the leaders of groups that use child soldiers are uncon-
cerned with morality, they will be unaffected by any ethical appeals.
Instead, the international community should focus on their trading part-
ners, upon whom such leaders depend for their riches. In these zones,
external economic actors such as multinational corporations often influ-
ence both state and local armed factions. They are also often complicit in
paying for protection from groups with child soldiers. 119 As the revised
practices of such corporate giants as Coke, Gap, and Nike illustrate from
the child labor and apartheid boycotts, businesses might be more vulnera-
ble to outside pressure than governments. As opposed to governments,
companies are often more concerned with negative public exposure and
the underlying threat of lawsuits and global boycotts.
To realistically confront the practice of arming children, the commu-
nity must recognize that nonstate groups are less amenable to external or
legal pressures than are government-sponsored armies. However, even
such organizations are vulnerable to certain measures that can change
their calculations of the costs and benefits of using child soldiers. Under
international law, all nonstate groups must respect the codes of warfare,
including the prohibition of the use of child soldiers, regardless of whether
they signed the initial agreements. Nonstate group leaders are, therefore,
liable to the same legal prosecution and stigmatization as state leaders.
These include not only indictment as war criminals but also the use of
targeted sanctions against them and their business associates. These sanc-
tions include the freezing of bank accounts or visa restrictions. 120 Given
the profit motivations fueling these nonstate groups, 12 1 trade prevention is
critical to crippling their tendency toward child exploitation. Such impedi-
ments should proscribe not just weapons transfers, as in most UN embar-
goes, but also the secondary and often illicit trade in valuable resources
that are used to fund illegal arms.
Those armed groups that refuse to acknowledge and follow the prohi-
bition of child soldiers violate one of the most basic tenets of international
law, and accordingly, they should be denied recognition and legitimacy
within the international community. This sense of legitimacy and respect
is something that is surprisingly craved by many such warlords. Interna-
tional connections offer a boost to the leaders' egos and offer a means to
distinguish themselves from their peers and deter subordinates and poten-
tial competitors. 122
In the 1990s, the United Nations, state governments, corporations
such as Unocal, 12 3 and even NGO leaders like Pat Robertson 124 sought to
119. Nicol Degli Innocenti, 'About 800,000 Children' Used as Soldiers, FIN. TIMES, June
13, 2001, at 10.
120. See generally MEGHAN O'SULLIVAN, SHREWD SANCTIONS (2003) (discussing the use
of sanctions on states which support terrorism).
121. Singer, supra note 14, at 4.
122. Author interview with expert on D.R.C.Qune 2003). See also WILLIAM RENO,
WARLORD POLITICs AND AFRICAN STATES (Lynne Reinner 1992).
123. Daniel Fisher, Kabuled Together, FORBES, Feb. 4, 2002, available at http://www.
forbes.com/global/2002/0204/020.html (last visited July 12, 2004); Brooke Shelby
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profit by treating child soldier users like Charles Taylor, Mullah Omar, and
Laurent Kabila as reputable and sovereign leaders. 12 5 Such shameful acts
should not occur again. Likewise, the urge to rehabilitate former "rogue
states" like Libya must take into account their role in supporting child sol-
dier users elsewhere, in full violation of international law (such as Libya's
support to the RUF in Sierra Leone and Charles Taylor in Liberia). 1 26
Finally, the rewards to child soldier groups that make only token demobili-
zations, such as the elevation of warlords in the Eastern Congo to states-
men, must end. Instead, the burden of proof must fall on these child
soldier users and abettors to prove their compliance with international law,
before they are accepted as legitimate players in the international arena.
NGOs and interested state governments should lobby and pressure
the international community to withhold recognition and all the benefits
that accrue (ranging from seats at the UN to international aid and trade) to
any groups that seize power through the use of child soldiers or to those
that aid them. This would send an effective message to other groups that
they will not be able to achieve their aims if they continue to use child
soldiers. Otherwise, humanitarian organizations should also hold them at
a distance-as they would treat those who are actively engaged in ethnic
cleansing or genocide. They should also pressure other groups and states
to act similarly. NGOs and interested states might provide further incen-
tives by connecting such efforts to proposals to broker agreements that
connect the flow of aid to the ending of child recruitment.
These efforts may prove insufficient, because the decisional calculus
of some child soldier groups, such as predatory groups and warlords, is
driven by nonpolitical rationales. These groups will require other action to
sway them. The payoffs of using children should be limited by proscribing
trade with such groups, targeting corporate bodies and other trading links.
Research has shown that the majority of "war economies" that reward local
predators and warlords are linked to the global economy. 12 7 The current
international campaign against the market for "blood diamonds" from
Sierra Leone and Angola provides a blueprint showing how to target these
profits.128
The international community should also target its external support
structures. Many such groups rely on donations and support from expatri-
ate support groups. For example, the LTTE has supporters in the expatri-
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ate Tamil communities of Australia, Canada, France, India, Norway, and
the United Kingdom, who provide critical monetary and logistical back-
ing.129 These outside enabling groups should be targeted for lobbying and
stigmatization efforts.
Finally, while they may be nonstate actors, many ultimately depend
on the backing of certain states. An example was the LRA's use of South-
ern Sudan as a training refuge or the RUF's basing in Liberia, 130 the
equivalent of hiding a criminal in one's garage. The support or presence of
such groups that use child soldiers should also render host states violators
of the international law. This liability would open the host state up to
outside pressure, including sanctions and asset seizures, which may indi-
rectly hinder the practice of nonstate groups employing child soldiers.
Conclusions
While certainly well-intentioned, the present strategy of raising aware-
ness and shaming child soldier users will only partially eliminate the
exploitation and abuse of children as soldiers. For the practice to end, an
additive of deterrence is required. Groups seeking to end the use of child
soldiers need a new strategy. They no longer need to convince the interna-
tional community that using child soldiers is ethically wrong. Instead, they
must change another belief, the common thinking of many conflict group
leaders that the benefits of using child soldiers outweigh the costs. By
directly responding to the doctrine itself and its underlying political and
economic rationales, groups seeking to end the use of child soldiers stand
a far better chance of affecting the calculus of would-be child soldier users.
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